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Abstract 
Cyberstalking is a significant challenge in the era of Internet and technology. When 
dealing with cyberstalking, institutions and governments alike have a problem in how 
to manage it and where to allocate resources. Hence, it is important to understand how 
individuals feel about the problem of cyberstalking so it can be managed in the context 
of cybersecurity. To do this the problem question is twofold: First, what objectives are 
important based on the values of the general public with regard to the prevention of 
cyberstalking. Second, what are the possible scenarios for the implementation of these 
objectives that organizations, governments and society at large can look to that will 
guide their decision making process. In this paper we utilize Keeney’s (1990) public 
value forum to elicit public values which can form the basis for the decision making 
process in preventing cyberstalking so institutions and governments can allocate 
resources prudently. 
Keywords: Cyberstalking, cyber security planning, values, strategic objectives, qualitative 
research 
Introduction 
The problem of stalking has been well recognized in the academic and practitioner literature. With the 
advent of newer technologies such as social media, however, a new threat has emerged. An increased 
reliance of individuals on cyber social contact has resulted in a corresponding increase in possibility of 
interpersonal intrusion, referred to as cyberstalking (McFarlane & Bocij 2005). This increase in 
cyberstalking results in harassment and victimization through the use of the internet and can even spill 
out into the non-cyber world. Institutions and government bodies have struggled to manage this new 
phenomenon due to a lack of understanding in the prevention of cyberstalking. Therefore, in order to 
solve a problem, it is essential to understand it from the perspective of those affected by it and implement 
solutions which address their concerns. The problem question is then twofold for this study: First, what 
objectives are important based on the values of the general public with regard to the prevention of 
cyberstalking. Second, what are the possible scenarios for the implementation of these objectives that 
organizations, governments and society at large can look to that will guide their decision making process. 
The goal of answering both questions should result in the creation of useful and effective policy aimed at 
the prevention of cyberstalking. In order to answer these questions we utilize Keeney’s (1990; 1992; 1996) 
public value forum and value based objectives to determine the most important objectives as well as the 
most highly rated scenarios for their implementation based on perceptions of the general public. This will 
serve as the basis for institutional decision-making process when developing policy aimed at the 
prevention of cyberstalking. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: In section one, the basis for the public value forum and the use of value-
based objectives is introduced and explained. In section two the basic process and structure of a public 
value forum is discussed. In section three we describe the application of the public value forum in which a 
sample of 21 individuals provided value inputs to the cyberstalking prevention policy decision-making 
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process. The results of this value forum are described in section four. In section five we conclude with a 
discussion of the meaning and implications of the results on cyberstalking prevention and policy making 
as well as the next steps in the process for informing policy decision making in this problem context.  
 
Public Values for Making Cyberstalking Prevention Policy Decisions 
 
Incorporating public values into the policymaking decision process has long been an acceptable practice, 
where the public’s opinion is intended to drive policy creation and implementation (Dhillon et al. 2016; 
Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006; Keeney 1996, Keeney 2013; Keeney and Palley 2013; May et al. 2013; 
Witesman & Walters 2014). Public opinion is driven by the inherent values of the collective individuals 
and can be useful in creating policy that is not only effective, but also accepted by those affected through 
its implementation (Keeney 1996; Dhillon et al. 2016; Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006). Due to these 
considerations, public values are an important consideration within policy decisions, and therefore need 
to be incorporated into the decision making process despite being a difficult task (Dhillon et al. 2016; 
Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006; Keeney 1996; Witesman & Walters 2014). Cyberstalking is a relatively new 
concept and research is being conducted with respect to things such as the characteristics of cyberstalkers 
(Cupach & Spitzberg 1998, 2001; Spitzberg et al. 1998; Spitzberg & Rhea 1999; Spitzberg et al. 2001) as 
well as the legal elements that must be evaluated (Goodno, 2007; Hazelwood & Koon-Magnin 2013). No 
work to date, however, has, been done to elicit public values regarding this phenomenon to inform policy 
decisions that aim to prevent its occurrence. While public values are important and can aid in making 
policy decisions, it is still unclear how policy makers should interpret public values for a specific policy 
context (Dhillon et al. 2016; Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006; Keeney 1990; 1996; 2013). According to Keeney 
(Dhillon et al. 2016; Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006; Keeney 1990; 1996; 2013) this includes things such as; 
how public values should be operationalized, what role the experts and their values should have, and how 
expert recommendations and value interpretations should be combined in policy making. Further it 
should be noted that these issues become more complex as the policy context increases in scope and the 
problem domain increases in complexity (Dhillon et al. 2016; Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006; Keeney 1990; 
1996; 2013). Therefore, several approaches exist which can shed light and help to clarify public values in 
complex policy problems such as surveys, indirect and direct value elicitation, focus groups and public 
involvement (Dhillon et al. 2016; Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006; Keeney 1990; 1996; 2013; May et al. 2013). 
Table 1 illustrates the advantages and disadvantages of each method of eliciting public values.  
 
 
 
Table 1. Public Value Elicitation Methods (based on Keeney 1990) 
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In this paper, a combination of Survey, focus group and direct value elicitation techniques are utilized in 
what is termed by Keeney (1990) as the “public value forum’. From this model, we examine various 
objectives and scenarios that can inform policy decision making by organizations and public officials 
(Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006; Keeney 2013; Witesman & Walters 2014). With respect to the prevention of 
cyberstalking, this is done by using a multi-attribute utility-based tradeoff procedure to elicit value-
relevant information from a focus group to arrive at preferences for policy alternatives (Dhillon & 
Torkzadeh 2006; Keeney 1988, 1990, 1996, 2013; Keeney and Gregory 2005). Initially interviews were 
conducted to determine values that then allowed for the creation of objectives and their attributes with 
respect to the prevention of cyberstalking (Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006; Keeney 1988, 1992; Keeney and 
Gregory 2005). A ‘WITI test’ (Why Is This Important test based on Keeney 1992) was performed to 
identify the fundamental objectives for the prevention of cyberstalking. From this, scenarios were created 
to present multiple policy implementation options for evaluation by the public value forum. The purpose 
of this study was three fold; Via a public value forum, our goal was to elicit public values about (1) five 
fundamental objectives aimed at the prevention of cyberstalking, (2) four overall cyberstalking prevention 
scenarios, and (3) each individual’s preference for the application of each given implementation scenario.  
 
The Public Value Forum Methodology 
 
The public value forum exists as a meeting of members of the general public, special interest groups or 
organizations that can last one to two days and usually involves anywhere between five and 25 
participants (Keeney 1990; Keeney 2013). To begin, a policy problem is outlined, then the fundamental 
objectives relating to the problem are presented along with their particular attributes, and an objective 
value tree is created. ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ scenarios are created along with varying alternatives which can be 
presented to the value forum and discussed to find a preferable solution to the given policy problem 
(Keeney 1990, 1996, 2013). The next step is to identify and select members from the general public to 
participate in the study to which Keeney (1990) notes that there are two basic approaches to do so. The 
first approach is that of the stakeholder approach where groups who have a specific stake in the outcome 
of any policy decisions are identified and asked to participate in the study. This can be especially useful 
when covering a controversial topic due to the emphasis on negotiation and conflict resolution (Keeney 
1990, 1996, 2013). The second way for selecting study participants for a value forum is the representative 
approach where members of the public are selected at random which is most useful when little to no 
knowledge exists about reasonable public values to drive policy decisions (Keeney 1990, 1996, 2013). Due 
to the relatively new nature of the cyberstalking phenomenon, little knowledge currently exists with 
respect to public values regarding policy decisions, and therefore the representative approach was 
selected for use in this study. Next, the Objectives and Attributes are defined and appropriate contrasting 
scenarios are created that illustrate ‘good’ and ‘bad’ scenarios as well as four alternatives of possible 
implementations of the defined objectives. Lastly, the value forum is conducted to elicit public values 
regarding cyberstalking prevention for policy decision-making and the results are analyzed. 
 
The general structure of the value forum is (Keeney 1990): 
  
1. The policy problem is introduced and participants motivated  
2. Objectives and attributes are defined and clarified  
3. Ranking and Single-attribute utility functions elicited from participants  
4. Tradeoffs among the attributes are elicited from participants 
 
The following is based on Keeney’s (1990) work and describes what each step of the value forum is 
intended to accomplish:  
 
1. Introduction and Motivation. To begin the forum it is important to provide participants with an 
understanding of the importance of using public value judgments in their decision making 
process. Participants are given an opportunity to ask any questions regarding clarification of the 
topic, in this study cyberstalking, before moving on to stage 2. 
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2. Defining Objectives and Attributes. Participants are given the value tree and each objective 
with their corresponding attributes clarified. The scenarios are also presented and clarified 
answering any questions by participants before moving to stage 3. 
 
3. Ranking and Elicitation of Single-Attribute Utility Functions. In stage 3 the quantitative levels 
of the attributes elicited may not be appropriate reflections of their relative desirability or utility. 
Therefore, utility functions are also used to demonstrate the relative desirability of a given 
objective or scenario. The choice of method depends on the purpose of the value forum and in 
many instances a simple rating method is sufficient.  
 
4. Elicitation of Tradeoffs. Tradeoffs among attributes express the relative importance of attribute 
units by defining the exchange rate of one attribute unit vs. another. There are many methods for 
eliciting tradeoffs and relative importance information, such as swing weighting, and the choice of 
the appropriate method depends again on the policy context and the purpose of the value forum.  
 
The Cyberstalking Prevention Value Forum 
 
Prior to beginning the value forum, participants (N=21) were selected as a random sample of volunteers. 
The participants ranged in age from 22 to 55 and had a split of a few more women than men. Some 
participants had an educational background in Information Security while others had no previous 
experience or education in this area. Several of the participants had either been previous victims of 
cyberstalking or knew of friends and family who had been victimized. Participants were mostly US-born 
citizens, however several participants were non-US citizens, but as a group were representative of the 
demographics of any major metropolitan city of the mid-Atlantic region in the US. All participants were at 
least aware of the concept of cyberstalking prior to beginning the public value forum. After participants 
were selected, they were first asked to provide values regarding the prevention of cyberstalking. From 
these values, five objectives were created with defining attributes and the problem context was re-clarified 
to ensure the objectives addressed the values that were elicited from the participants. The values were 
elicited through personal interviews using suitable probing techniques that asked four open-ended 
questions regarding personal values towards the act of cyberstalking, created using Keeney’s (1992) 
Value-Focused Thinking technique. These fundamental objectives were derived from the collective 
interviews using Keeney’s (1992) ‘WITI’ test and presented to and discussed by the participants of the 
value forum. After the participants were satisfied with the fundamental objectives created by the value 
forum they were placed in the form of a value tree (see Figure 1).  Any additional clarification or revision 
of the fundamental objectives was done at this time before moving to step 2 in the process.  
Using these fundamental objectives, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ scenarios were created along with four alternate 
scenarios that represented differing instantiations of the five objectives based on the understanding of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ in the decision context. Once this was complete, a diagram (see Figure 1) representing the 
five objectives with their attributes, a ‘value quote’ and sub-objectives was developed and provided to the 
participants for reference during the remainder of the value forum. After this step of the value forum was 
completed, participants were given the task of providing objective ranking and weighting, both prior to 
reviewing the explanations of the objective meanings and then again at the end of the study. The 
participants were asked to rank the five objectives for the prevention of cyberstalking (See Table 2); first 
in order of their perceived importance (1 = Highest, 5 = Lowest), then they were asked to review the ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ scenario for each objective and rank the magnitude of change or ‘swing’ between these scenarios 
for each objective from largest (1) to smallest (5). This means participants assigned a weight that indicated 
the relative magnitude of a given ‘swing’ with respect to the scenario they rated as having the largest 
degree of change between the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ scenario.  From there, the objective rated 1 is then assigned 
a weight of 100, the lowest rating of 5 is given a weight of 0, and all others receive weight between 0-100 
in decreasing increments by order of rank (Keeney 1990; Kirkwood, 1997). The purpose of the initial and 
final ranking and weighting was to determine how, if at all, the perceptions of participants change during 
the study from their initial impression. Initially they are only provided operational definitions of the 
objectives for the prevention of cyberstalking, but by the end of the study they have thoroughly examined 
a multitude of scenarios that express the potential applications of these objectives in real-world scenarios 
(Keeney 1990; Kirkwood 1997). 
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Figure 1. Objective Based Value Tree 
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Objective 
Importance Swing 
% (0-100) 
Objective 
Importance Swing 
Rank (1-5) 
Objective 
Importance Rank 
(1-5) 
Cyberstalking Fundamental 
Objectives 
90 2 1 Protect Online Interaction 
80 3 2 Increase cyberstalking security procedures 
100 1 3 Ensure technical security 
0 5 5 Develop strong values system 
60 4 4 Define intermediaries to minimize 
cyberstalking 
 
Table 2. Example of Objective Ranking and Weighting 
In addition to the ranking and weighting of the objectives, participants also examined scenarios labeled A, 
B, C and D which expressed different potential real-world instantiations of the cyberstalking prevention 
objective.  These scenarios (see Table 3) were juxtaposed with the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ scenarios and 
participants were asked to rank them in order of preference with respect to the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ scenarios, 
with their most preferred scenario receiving a 2 and least preferred receiving a 5. The ‘good’ scenario was 
rated as 1 and bad as 6 in order to provide a conceptual basis of understanding in providing scenario 
preference ranks by the participants. After the ranking of the four scenarios, participants were asked to 
give an importance weight (Keeney 1990; Kirkwood 1997), again with respect to the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
scenarios, which were assigned 100 and 0 respectively. This was done to allow participants to 
demonstrate how close they felt the respective scenarios came to the conception of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in 
these instantiations of the objectives beyond mere ranking (i.e. while a scenario may have ranked 2, a 
participant may have felt it was only 50% of the way to being a ‘good’ implementation of the objectives, so 
this allowed them to demonstrate how ‘close’ to good they felt a scenario came). Once this task of ranking 
the various scenarios was completed, participants were then asked to rank each instance of the scenarios 
A, B, C and D by the individual objective. 
During the evaluation of the overall scenarios, participants may have been forced to select an overall 
scenario ranking based on only a few aspects of a given scenario which they assigned more importance to 
than one or more other parts (i.e. participants may have ranked scenario C as the most overall preferred 
but only felt one objective C scenario was most preferable). In order to determine if participants may have 
actually preferred a differing implementation of each objective by scenario, they were asked to rank each 
scenario individually by the objective (see Table 4). This allowed participants to, for example, select 
scenario C for the objective Ensure Technical Security as their most preferred while also being able to 
select scenario A for the objective Increase Cyberstalking Security Procedures as their most preferred. 
Participants were also asked to assign an importance weight to each ranking, using the same scale as 
before, with respect to how close to a ‘good’ implementation each scenario was represented. The purpose 
of this presented how preferred each individual scenario was to each participant and how relative to ‘good’ 
each scenario was as well. After the entire scenario ranking and weighting was accomplished the 
participants were finally asked to re-rank and weight the overall objectives for the prevention of 
cyberstalking as previously stated.  
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Table 3. Scenario Ranking 
Cyberstalking 
Fundamental 
Objectives
Good Scenario Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D Bad Scenario
PROTECT ONLINE 
INTERACTION
 -Highly secured and safe online 
meetings
 -Safe use of online public 
forums
 -Diverse protection 
mechanisms for online forums
 -Harmful online chat rooms 
eliminated
 -Online meeting sites highly 
regulated and can be removed 
by governments or 
organizations at will
-Public online forums use must 
be approved beforehand
-Protection mechanisms in 
online forums are mandatory
-Online chat rooms considered 
harmful are removed entirely
 -Online meeting sites highly restricted 
and regulated, but allowed to exist 
-Use of public forums is highly regulated 
with some restrictions
-Many protection mechanisms in online 
forums are mandatory, but not all
-Online chat rooms considered harmful 
can be removed entirely
 -Online meeting sites regulated but 
users accept some risk in using them
-Use of public forums has basic 
restrictions such as age or prior 
consent to use
-Protection mechanisms in online 
forums are 'opt out' at the users 
discretion
-Online chat rooms considered 
harmful are labeled harmful and have 
basic restrictions for viewing
 -Online meeting sites have little to no 
regulation, user assumes all risk
-Public forums unregulated and 
unrestricted as users determine all 
content
-Any protection mechanisms for an 
online forums are 'opt in' by user
-Online chat rooms considered harmful 
allowed to exist with no warnings, users 
must avoid on their own
 -Online meetings are insecure 
with no regulation
 -Dangerous forums are allowed 
in any form to public
 -No protection mechanisms for 
online forums
 -Harmful online chat rooms run 
rampant
INCREASE 
CYBERSTALKING 
SECURITY PROCEDURES
 -Secure online browsing
 -Strict user authentication 
measures
 -High availability of 
cyberstalking prevention tools
 -Websites validated for 
trustworthiness
 -All browsing security 
measure's use online enforced 
by law
-Authentication measures 
compelled by law for all online 
use
-Cyberstalking prevention tools 
required by law
-All websites must be evaluated 
for trustworthiness and 
approved before posting to 
internet
 -Some browsing security measure's use 
online enforced by law
-Some authentication measures 
compelled by law for all online use
-Some cyberstalking prevention tools 
required by law
-All websites evaluated for 
trustworthiness, but those that fail are 
clearly marked as untrustworthy by law
 -Browsing security measures online 
exist and are 'opt-out' by user
-Authentication measures on my 
default for all online use, but user can 
'opt-out'
-Cyberstalking prevention tools exist 
by law but user can 'opt-out' of use
-Websites can be evaluated for 
trustworthiness and labeled as such, 
but no requirment to label untrusted 
sites
 -Any browsing security measures are 
'opt-in' by user and not required by law
-Authentication measures exist but not 
required, user assumes all risk
-Cyberstalking prevention tools disabled 
by default, user must 'opt-in' to use
-All websites are not required to be 
evaluated for trustworthiness and are 
labled at owner discretion
 -Unsecure online browsing
 -No user authentication 
measures
 -No available cyberstalking 
prevention tools
 -Websites not validated for 
trustworthiness
ENSURE TECHNICAL 
SECURITY
 -High investment in safe 
browsing technologies
-All available tools used to 
prevent stealing of information 
online
-Login credentials managed 
effectively
-All security settings can be 
managed for online activity
-Online filters can block 
negative behavior
 -Government mandated 
investment in safe browsing 
technologies by organizations
-All available tools to prevent 
stealing of information required 
by law
-Safe login credentials 
management regulated by 
government
-Security settings online 
monitored and enforced by 
government or organizations
-Online filters to block negative 
behavior compulsory
 -Some government mandated 
minimum investment in safe browsing 
technologies by organizations
-Some minimum tools to prevent 
stealing of information required by law
-Safe login credentials management 
required, but managed by organization 
and user
-Some security settings online are 
compulsory
-Some use of online filters to block 
negative behavior compulsory
 -Investment in safe browsing 
technologies controlled solely by 
organizations
-Available tools to prevent stealing of 
information exist and are 'opt-out' by 
user
-Safe login credentials management 
regulated by user and are 'opt-out'
-Security settings online monitored 
and enforced by user and are 'opt-out'
-Online filters to block negative 
behavior managed by user and are 
'opt-out'
 -Limited investment in safe browsing 
technologies
-Some tools to prevent stealing of 
information exist and are 'opt-in' by 
user
-Safe login credentials management 
regulated by user and are 'opt-in'
-Some security settings online can be 
monitored by user, but are 'opt-in'
-Any online filters to block negative 
behavior are managed by user who 
must 'opt-in'
 -No investment in safe browsing 
technologies
-No available tools to prevent 
stealing of information online
-Login credentials not managed 
at all
-No security settings for 
protecting online activity
-No online filters to block 
negative behavior
DEVELOP STRONG 
VALUES SYSTEM
 -Strong family values that 
prevent cyberstalking
-Social pressures reduce or 
eliminate cyberstalking
-Family support ensures safe 
information sharing measures
 -Mandatory programs to impart 
strong family values to deter 
cyberstalking
-Intense social pressures to 
reduce cyberstalking supported 
by various programs
-Family support mandatory in 
ensuring information protection 
measures by users
 -Programs exist to impart strong family 
values to deter cyberstalking with 
minimum attendence required
-Some social pressures used to reduce 
cyberstalking supported by various 
programs
-Family support encouraged in ensuring 
information protection measures by 
users
 -Some programs exist to impart 
strong family values to deter 
cyberstalking, people can 'opt-out'
-Some social pressures encouraged to 
reduce cyberstalking
-Minimum level of family support 
encouraged to ensuring information 
protection of users
 -Programs exist to impart strong family 
values to deter cyberstalking, but are 
'opt-in'
-Little social pressure to reduce 
cyberstalking
-Little family support encouraged for 
ensuring information protection 
measures by users
 -Lack of family values 
encourages cyberstalking 
behavior
-Social pressures encourage 
cyberstalking
-No family support to ensure safe 
information sharing online
DEFINE INTERMEDIARIES 
TO MINIMIZE 
CYBERSTALKING
 -Online payment systems 
ensure security
-Services for hire protect 
consumer online information
-Personal information insurance 
protects privacy
-Trust forming mechanisms 
exist to protect against 
cyberstalking
 -Third party payment systems 
mandated and regulated to 
ensure online security
-Services for hire mandated to 
protect consumer online 
information
-Personal online information 
insurance required to protect 
privacy
-Mandatory trust forming 
mechanisms to protect against 
cyberstalking
 -Third party payment systems exist to 
ensure online security with minimum 
use required
-Services for hire exist to protect 
consumer online information with 
minimum use required
-Personal online information insurance 
minimum required to protect privacy
-Some mandatory trust forming 
mechanisms required to protect against 
cyberstalking
 -Third party payment systems exist to 
ensure online security, used at user 
discretion
-Services for hire exist to protect 
consumer online information, used at 
user discretion
-Personal online information 
insurance exist but not required to 
protect privacy
-Some minimum mandatory trust 
forming mechanisms required to 
protect against cyberstalking
 -Few third party payment systems exist 
to ensure online security
-Few services for hire to protect 
consumer online information
-Personal online information insurance 
not required to protect privacy and has 
no regulation for coverage
-No mandatory trust forming 
mechanisms to protect against 
cyberstalking
 -Online payment systems lack 
security
-No services exist to protect 
consumer online information
-No personal information 
insurance to protect privacy
-No trust forming mechanisms 
exist to protect against 
cyberstalking
Scenario Rank (1-6) 1 5 3 2 4 6
Scenario % (0-100) 100 10 80 90 50 0
 Eliciting Societal Values for Cyberstalking Policy Decisions 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 8 
 
Table 4. Individual Scenario Ranking Survey 
Scenarios
PROTECT ONLINE 
INTERACTION
Rank 
(1-6)
Weight 
(0-100)
INCREASE 
CYBERSTALKING SECURITY 
PROCEDURES
Rank 
(1-6)
Weight 
(0-100)
ENSURE TECHNICAL SECURITY
Rank 
(1-6)
Weight 
(0-100)
DEVELOP STRONG 
VALUES SYSTEM
Rank 
(1-6)
Weight 
(0-100)
DEFINE INTERMEDIARIES 
TO MINIMIZE 
CYBERSTALKING
Rank 
(1-6)
Weight 
(0-100)
Good Scenario
 -Highly secured and safe 
online meetings
 -Safe use of online public 
forums
 -Diverse protection 
mechanisms for online forums
 -Harmful online chat rooms 
eliminated
1 100
 -Secure online browsing
 -Strict user authentication 
measures
 -High availability of 
cyberstalking prevention tools
 -Websites validated for 
trustworthiness
1 100
 -High investment in safe browsing 
technologies
-All available tools used to prevent 
stealing of information online
-Login credentials managed 
effectively
-All security settings can be 
managed for online activity
-Online filters can block negative 
behavior
1 100
 -Strong family values that 
prevent cyberstalking
-Social pressures reduce or 
eliminate cyberstalking
-Family support ensures safe 
information sharing 
measures
1 100
 -Online payment systems 
ensure security
-Services for hire protect 
consumer online information
-Personal information 
insurance protects privacy
-Trust forming mechanisms 
exist to protect against 
cyberstalking
1 100
Scenario A
 -Online meeting sites highly 
regulated and can be removed 
by governments or 
organizations at will
-Public online forums use must 
be approved beforehand
-Protection mechanisms in 
online forums are mandatory
-Online chat rooms considered 
harmful are removed entirely
 -All browsing security 
measure's use online enforced 
by law
-Authentication measures 
compelled by law for all online 
use
-Cyberstalking prevention tools 
required by law
-All websites must be 
evaluated for trustworthiness 
and approved before posting 
to internet
 -Government mandated investment 
in safe browsing technologies by 
organizations
-All available tools to prevent 
stealing of information required by 
law
-Safe login credentials management 
regulated by government
-Security settings online monitored 
and enforced by government or 
organizations
-Online filters to block negative 
behavior compulsory
 -Mandatory programs to 
impart strong family values 
to deter cyberstalking
-Intense social pressures to 
reduce cyberstalking 
supported by various 
programs
-Family support mandatory in 
ensuring information 
protection measures by users
 -Third party payment systems 
mandated and regulated to 
ensure online security
-Services for hire mandated to 
protect consumer online 
information
-Personal online information 
insurance required to protect 
privacy
-Mandatory trust forming 
mechanisms to protect against 
cyberstalking
Scenario B
 -Online meeting sites highly 
restricted and regulated, but 
allowed to exist 
-Use of public forums is highly 
regulated with some 
restrictions
-Many protection mechanisms 
in online forums are 
mandatory, but not all
-Online chat rooms considered 
harmful can be removed 
entirely
 -Some browsing security 
measure's use online enforced 
by law
-Some authentication 
measures compelled by law for 
all online use
-Some cyberstalking 
prevention tools required by 
law
-All websites evaluated for 
trustworthiness, but those 
that fail are clearly marked as 
untrustworthy by law
 -Some government mandated 
minimum investment in safe 
browsing technologies by 
organizations
-Some minimum tools to prevent 
stealing of information required by 
law
-Safe login credentials management 
required, but managed by 
organization and user
-Some security settings online are 
compulsory
-Some use of online filters to block 
negative behavior compulsory
 -Programs exist to impart 
strong family values to deter 
cyberstalking with minimum 
attendence required
-Some social pressures used 
to reduce cyberstalking 
supported by various 
programs
-Family support encouraged 
in ensuring information 
protection measures by users
 -Third party payment systems 
exist to ensure online security 
with minimum use required
-Services for hire exist to 
protect consumer online 
information with minimum 
use required
-Personal online information 
insurance minimum required 
to protect privacy
-Some mandatory trust 
forming mechanisms required 
to protect against 
cyberstalking
Scenario C
 -Online meeting sites 
regulated but users accept 
some risk in using them
-Use of public forums has basic 
restrictions such as age or prior 
consent to use
-Protection mechanisms in 
online forums are 'opt out' at 
the users discretion
-Online chat rooms considered 
harmful are labeled harmful 
and have basic restrictions for 
viewing
 -Browsing security measures 
online exist and are 'opt-out' 
by user
-Authentication measures on 
my default for all online use, 
but user can 'opt-out'
-Cyberstalking prevention tools 
exist by law but user can 'opt-
out' of use
-Websites can be evaluated for 
trustworthiness and labeled as 
such, but no requirment to 
label untrusted sites
 -Investment in safe browsing 
technologies controlled solely by 
organizations
-Available tools to prevent stealing 
of information exist and are 'opt-
out' by user
-Safe login credentials management 
regulated by user and are 'opt-out'
-Security settings online monitored 
and enforced by user and are 'opt-
out'
-Online filters to block negative 
behavior managed by user and are 
'opt-out'
 -Some programs exist to 
impart strong family values 
to deter cyberstalking, 
people can 'opt-out'
-Some social pressures 
encouraged to reduce 
cyberstalking
-Minimum level of family 
support encouraged to 
ensuring information 
protection of users
 -Third party payment systems 
exist to ensure online security, 
used at user discretion
-Services for hire exist to 
protect consumer online 
information, used at user 
discretion
-Personal online information 
insurance exist but not 
required to protect privacy
-Some minimum mandatory 
trust forming mechanisms 
required to protect against 
cyberstalking
Scenario D
 -Online meeting sites have 
little to no regulation, user 
assumes all risk
-Public forums unregulated 
and unrestricted as users 
determine all content
-Any protection mechanisms 
for an online forums are 'opt 
in' by user
-Online chat rooms considered 
harmful allowed to exist with 
no warnings, users must avoid 
on their own
 -Any browsing security 
measures are 'opt-in' by user 
and not required by law
-Authentication measures exist 
but not required, user assumes 
all risk
-Cyberstalking prevention tools 
disabled by default, user must 
'opt-in' to use
-All websites are not required 
to be evaluated for 
trustworthiness and are labled 
at owner discretion
 -Limited investment in safe 
browsing technologies
-Some tools to prevent stealing of 
information exist and are 'opt-in' by 
user
-Safe login credentials management 
regulated by user and are 'opt-in'
-Some security settings online can 
be monitored by user, but are 'opt-
in'
-Any online filters to block negative 
behavior are managed by user who 
must 'opt-in'
 -Programs exist to impart 
strong family values to deter 
cyberstalking, but are 'opt-in'
-Little social pressure to 
reduce cyberstalking
-Little family support 
encouraged for ensuring 
information protection 
measures by users
 -Few third party payment 
systems exist to ensure online 
security
-Few services for hire to 
protect consumer online 
information
-Personal online information 
insurance not required to 
protect privacy and has no 
regulation for coverage
-No mandatory trust forming 
mechanisms to protect against 
cyberstalking
Bad Scenario
 -Online meetings are 
insecure with no regulation
 -Dangerous forums are 
allowed in any form to 
public
 -No protection mechanisms 
for online forums
 -Harmful online chat rooms 
run rampant
6 0
 -Unsecure online browsing
 -No user authentication 
measures
 -No available cyberstalking 
prevention tools
 -Websites not validated for 
trustworthiness
6 0
 -No investment in safe browsing 
technologies
-No available tools to prevent 
stealing of information online
-Login credentials not managed 
at all
-No security settings for 
protecting online activity
-No online filters to block 
negative behavior
6 0
 -Lack of family values 
encourages cyberstalking 
behavior
-Social pressures 
encourage cyberstalking
-No family support to 
ensure safe information 
sharing online
6 0
 -Online payment systems 
lack security
-No services exist to protect 
consumer online 
information
-No personal information 
insurance to protect privacy
-No trust forming 
mechanisms exist to 
protect against 
cyberstalking
6 0
Objective Rank (1-5)
Objective Swing Rank          
(1-5)
Objective Swing 
Weighting (0-100)
 Eliciting Societal Values for Cyberstalking Policy Decisions 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 9 
Results of the Public Value Forum 
 
With the data collection from participants completed, an analysis was conducted on the findings for which 
the results will be discussed in the following three parts; First, the overall initial and final Importance and 
Swing rankings and Swing weightings. Second, the overall scenario ranking and weightings and lastly, the 
individual scenario ranking and weightings by objective.  
Initial Importance Rank, Swing rank and Swing weight Data 
To begin, each of the five objectives were defined for the participants and they were asked to rank them in 
order of importance (See Table 5). The study found that in the initial rankings of the objectives, 
participants provided Ensure Technical Security (ETS) and Increase Cyberstalking Security Procedures 
(ICSP) with the highest overall median ranks of 2, while the objective Protect Online interaction (POI) 
was assigned a median rank of 3 and Develop Strong Values System (DSVS) and Define Intermediaries to 
Prevent Cyberstalking (DIPC) were assigned median rankings of 4. Based on these initial rankings, 
participants, with only a definitional understanding of the objectives, clearly rate technical and procedural 
prevention measures highest in importance in the prevention of cyberstalking.  
Next, participants assigned swing ratings for each objective based on the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ scenarios 
provided, which revealed that the difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ scenarios for each objective were 
like-wise rated highest in the technical and procedural objectives with ETS and ICSP each receiving a 
median swing rank of 2. Interestingly, it was found that participants also found DIPC had a large change 
from ‘bad’ to good’ and provided a median rank of 3, while POI and DSVS were given median ranks of 4. 
This seems to indicate that participant’s felt that not only were ETS and ICSP very important overall, the 
swing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ implementations was likewise the largest contrast. With the weights 
(Keeney 1990; Kirkwood 1997) for each swing ranking, participants were asked to demonstrate how 
drastic the change between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ scenarios was for each objective. This provided an astounding 
result that demonstrated how important the objectives were as ETS and ICSP received mean weights of 
83.19 and 74.33 respectively (out of 100), while DIPC received 65.05, POI 56.95 and DSVS a mere 40.62 
mean weight. This would lead one to conclude that if faced with limited resources a strong focus on 
technical and procedural prevention objectives might address the most pressing concerns of engaged 
users as these objectives were not only rated the highest, but also weighted most heavily by participants as 
having the largest degree of impact between a ‘bad’ and ‘good’ implementation. 
 
Table 5. Initial Ranking and Weighting Results 
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Final Importance Rank, Swing rank and Swing weight Data 
After the overall and individual scenario ranking and weighting was completed, participants were then 
asked to re-evaluate their prior objective ranking and weightings to determine whether after seeing 
potential real-world implementations of the objectives their perceptions towards them had changed (See 
Table 6). It was found that the overall importance rankings stayed relatively similar, with ETS and ICSP 
retaining median rankings of 2; however POI rose in its median ranking to 2 from 3, while DSVS and 
DIPC stayed the same with a median ranking of 4 for each. Swing rankings for each objective changed the 
most dramatically as it appears that seeing proposed instances of implementation enhanced participants 
understanding of the objectives. Median swing ranks for ETS and ICSP remained at 2, while POI moved 
up from 4 to 3, DIPC stayed at 3 and DSVS fell from 4 to 5. To highlight the magnitude of these changes, 
POI initially had a mean weight of 56.95 its mean weight on the final evaluation rose to 72.67, while the 
fall of DSVS from 4 to 5 in swing rank did not result in such a large change (40.62 to 40.24 mean weight). 
DIPC saw a large drop in mean weight from 65.05 to 52.19 even though it retained the swing rank of 3.  
 
Table 6. Final Ranking and Weighting Results 
This final recap of Importance Rank, Swing Rank and Swing Weight is useful because it re-emphasizes the 
importance of the technical and procedural objectives as well as highlights the impact ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
implementations of each objective has in the public perception of the prevention of cyberstalking. 
Further, a deeper understanding of POI revealed that when participants were provided with real-world 
examples of scenarios illustrating the objectives, the protection of their online interactions received more 
importance and the difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ scenarios was viewed as much greater than they 
initially perceived. This finding revealed the importance of both creating a comprehensive understanding 
of the concept of the cyberstalking prevention objectives as well as how real-world instantiations of each 
objective can impact the public’s conceptions of an objective’s importance with respect to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
implementations.  
Scenario Selection Preference 
As an organization that is looking to prevent and protect customers from cyberstalking, understanding the 
importance of the objective to their users is useful in directing the allocation of finite resources. It is also 
of equal importance, however, to understand the means by which a government organization can enact 
those objectives to prevent cyberstalking and prior to doing so, anticipate the preferred method by which 
users will respond to those measures in the most positive way. This was first done in the study by having 
participants evaluate the scenario ‘options’ in a holistic manner where the scenarios, labeled A, B, C and 
D, ranged from high organization involvement (scenario A) to very little organization involvement 
(scenario D). Participants were asked to rank, based on their preference, the order in which the scenarios 
represented ‘good’ to ‘bad’ options, with 2 being their most preferred and 5 being their least preferred 
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overall scenario for the objective’s implementation. Lastly, participants weighted their rankings relative to 
how ‘good’ or ‘bad’ they were compared to the baseline good and bad scenarios. 
The results from this portion of the study (see Table 7) provided insight into the consumer preferences 
with respect to the actions a government body or organization should take in the prevention of 
cyberstalking. The study found that participants heavily favored scenario C with a median rank of 2 and a 
mean weight of 79.19, demonstrating that they found an option where the technical tools and procedures 
exist and can be turned on or off at the preference of the user and that some level of regulation is 
preferred in order to ensure the adequacy of these prevention methods. By contrast, scenario D was the 
least preferred of all the scenarios receiving a median rank of 5 and a mean weight of 45.19, indicating 
that participants did not find a ‘hands off’ approach appealing. This approach leaves the vast majority of 
the responsibility for prevention in the hands of the user. This contrast is very important for government 
organizations as it demonstrates that users clearly want mechanisms in place that work to prevent 
cyberstalking, but they prefer to maintain a level of control and discretion over the exact use and 
implementation of those prevention mechanisms as opposed to having mechanisms forced upon them. 
 
Table 7. Overall Scenario Ranking and Weighting Results 
Individual Scenario selection by Objective 
In this final portion of the study participants were asked to rank, in order of preference, each scenario by 
the objective. This was done to assess whether participants may prefer different methods of cyberstalking 
prevention implementation based on the given objective. The results (see Table 8) from this method of 
individual scenario selection and preference indicate that, generally scenario B and C, are the preferred 
choices for objective implementation with scenario B leading scenario C in every objective but POI. This is 
interesting to note as scenario B in POI calls for a high degree of mandatory regulation which could have 
caused participants who would likely have preferred scenario B overall to instead select the less restrictive 
scenario C and rank it higher in a holistic situation. However, individually, scenario B is generally more 
preferred than scenario C, but are clearly the two most preferred scenarios overall for the cyberstalking 
prevention objectives. This is still in line with the original inference from the previous section where it 
appears participants still prefer a degree of autonomy in the final implementation of these objectives, but 
like-wise want a degree of regulation and law to enforce the existence of procedures, guidelines and 
technical controls. Based on these results it would be reasonable to suggest that users would prefer an 
‘opt-out’ method where the existence of cyberstalking prevention tools were enforced in law, but the 
ultimate use by consumers was at their own discretion. 
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Table 8. Individual Scenario Ranking and Weighting Results 
Discussion 
After reviewing the results and drawing on the insights of each individual section herein, three distinct 
broad conclusions can be drawn based on this research. The first is that baseline regulations must exist in 
order to aid organizations in the prevention of cyberstalking and provide users with the confidence that 
the issue is being addressed. The second is that users desire technical controls in place that can be used to 
protect them and their information from potential cyberstalking. Finally, while albeit related to the 
previous two, users want the freedom to choose to what extent the regulations and controls for prevention 
of cyber stalking should be implemented. These three distinct conclusions provide a great deal of insight 
into the values of the general public regarding the prevention of cyberstalking at an organizational level. 
The results of the public value forum demonstrate a clear desire by participants to have clear regulations, 
policies and procedures that elucidate required protections against cyberstalking. Scenario D that 
provided little or no governance to this issue, regardless of objective, was the least preferred by virtually 
all participants, as it received no top rankings and 12 last place rankings. Participants additionally 
demonstrated this need for strong technical controls both by ranking Ensure Technical Security highly in 
the objective ratings as well as through the selection of scenarios, which indicated a high degree of 
technical tools, which would be available to users for protection from cyberstalking. In the application of 
policy and technical controls, participants demonstrated clear preferences for control over final 
implementation and enforcement. By reviewing the scenario selection and individual scenario preferences 
it was shown that participants still prefer a degree of control, which would likely aid in the successful 
implementation of policy. 
At a scenario level, Scenario C was the clear preference in the value forum, which was composed of 
individual instantiations of the five objectives for preventing cyberstalking and had the following 
characteristics: Some general government mandated regulations about policy and technical controls, a 
bevy of technical control options available to the user and the ability of users to ‘opt-out’ from these 
controls if they felt it added undue burden or restriction. This is important to note in the context of the 
overall user scenario selection. It can be said that even if something is ‘good for you,’ if it is forced upon 
the user, they may reject it regardless of the risk, for which there is some support in the literature for this 
assertion. As Herley (2009), in the context of security and usability noted, “users reject advice since it 
offers to shield them from the direct costs of attacks, but burdens them with increased indirect costs, or 
externalities. Since the direct costs are generally small relative to the indirect ones they reject this bargain. 
Since victimization is rare, and imposes a one-time cost, while security advice applies to everyone and is 
an ongoing cost, the burden ends up being larger than that caused by the ill it addresses.” Having some 
regulation to enforce protocols and technical controls in place, but giving the user freedom in choosing 
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the level of restriction proved popular even at the individual scenario ranking level where scenario B 
options tended to be the most preferred with C a close second overall. Scenario B tended to provide 
similar options to C, but the difference was that when it comes to procedures and technical controls, users 
clearly feel it is better to have procedures and technical controls clearly defined by the law. These points 
clearly support the three distinct conclusions drawn and mentioned previously in that they illustrate a 
very clear desire among the general public to have well defined laws, regulations, procedures and 
technical controls for the prevention of cyberstalking. This leads us to the limitations of the current study 
as well as the future directions of this cyberstalking prevention research stream. 
The current limitation of this study is that it did not include Keeney’s (Keeney 1990, 2013; Dhillon & 
Torkzadeh 2006; May et al. 2013) fifth step of constructing a multi-attribute utility model and the 
evaluation of alternatives through the use of an expert panel. In the construction of a multi-attribute 
utility model the tradeoff information elicited in step 4 is converted into weights for the attributes using 
standard multi-attribute utility techniques (Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006; Keeney 1990). In the vast 
majority of instances the multi-attribute utility model in question is a simple weighted average of the 
single-attribute utilities; some can be more complex multiplicative or multilinear models (Dhillon & 
Torkzadeh 2006; Keeney 1990, 2013). In the case of this research, it is believed that a more complex 
model needs to be chosen and therefore additional tradeoff questions will need to be asked that will elicit 
additional parameters for a model (Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006; Keeney 1990, 2013). To do this, a multi-
attribute utility model is created from a combination of expert assessments of the single-attribute 
performance of the scenario alternatives to generate an overall evaluation (Dhillon & Torkzadeh 2006; 
Keeney 1990, 2013). This is to say that, the expert opinions not present in this study (a current limitation) 
will be elicited from a panel of industry experts and then additively placed in a model along with the 
results of the general public’s value forum. This will create a model that demonstrates both the values of 
the general public as well as the values of industry experts and will serve as the next step in the direction 
of this research. In a future research a panel of 5 industry experts ranging from a CIO to an attorney 
specializing in cyberstalking and stalking legal matters will be engaged in an ‘expert’ value forum that will 
elicit their values for use in the creation of a multi-attribute utility model. This new model will then serve 
as the foundation for additional research to establish a clear methodology for the decision making process 
to create and implement policies intended to prevent cyberstalking.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the research presented in this paper examines the relatively unexplored area of 
cyberstalking in the field of information systems. This qualitative investigation, which used value-focused 
thinking and the public value forum, revealed the objectives and scenarios which the general public find 
most important and provide the greatest perceived deterrent to cyberstalking, which are essential for 
developing measures and protections against cyberstalking at a policy level by governments and 
organizations. Therefore, this is a significant contribution as previous research in this area is under-
developed and as such falls short of being able to propose tangible measures and protections against 
cyberstalking. Results clearly indicate a strong preference by the general public for technical and 
procedural controls aimed at the prevention of cyberstalking at a policy level, but still leaves final control 
over the exact implementation to the people themselves. The next steps in this research will extend the 
process further and provide a multi-attribute utility model that will incorporate the values of 
cyberstalking experts in order to provide an exact model for the creation of cyberstalking prevention 
policy at a governmental and organizational level.   
References 
Cupach, W. and Spitzberg, B. 1998. ‘Obsessive Relational Intrusion and Stalking’, in B. Spitzberg and W. 
Cupach (eds) The Dark Side of Close Relationships, pp. 233–63. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Cupach, W. and Spitzberg, B. 2001. ‘Obsessive Relational Intrusion: Incidence, Perceived Severity, and 
Coping’, Violence and Victims 15(1): 1–16. 
Dhillon, G., Oliveira, T., Susarapu, S., & Caldeira, M. (2016). Deciding between information security and 
usability: Developing value based objectives. Computers in Human Behavior, 61, 656-666.  
 Eliciting Societal Values for Cyberstalking Policy Decisions 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 14 
 
Dhillon, G., & Torkzadeh, G. 2006. Value-focused assessment of information system security in 
organizations. Information Systems Journal, 16(3), 293-314.  
 
Goodno, N. H. 2007. Cyberstalking, a New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and 
Federal Laws; Missouri Law Review, Vol 72, Issue 1. 
 
Hazelwood, S., & Koon-Magnin, S. 2013. Cyber Stalking and Cyber Harassment Legislation in the 
United States: A Qualitative Analysis. International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 7(2), 155-168. 
 
Herley, C. 2009. So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the rational rejection of security advice by 
users. In Proceedings of the 2009 workshop on New security paradigms workshop (pp. 133-144). ACM. 
Keeney, R. L. 1988. Structuring objectives for problems of public interest. Operations Research 36(3), 
396–405. 
Keeney, R. L., Winterfeldt, D. V., & Eppel, T. 1990. Eliciting Public Values for Complex Policy Decisions. 
Management Science, 36(9), 1011-1030. 
  
Keeney, R. L. 1992. Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decision making. Harvard University 
Press. 
Keeney, R. L. 1996. Value-focused thinking: Identifying decision opportunities and creating alternatives. 
European Journal of Operational Research 92(3), 537–549. 
Keeney, R. L. and Gregory R. S. 2005. Selecting attributes to measure the achievement of objectives. 
Operations Research 53(1), 1–11. 
Keeney, R. L. 2013. Foundations for Group Decision Analysis. Decision Analysis, 10(2), 103-120. 
 
Keeney, R. L., & Palley, A. B. 2013. Decision Strategies to Reduce Teenage and Young Adult Deaths in the 
United States. Risk Analysis, 33(9), 1661-1676.  
  
Kirkwood, C. W. 1997. Strategic Decision Making, Multi-objective Decision Analysis with Spreadsheets. 
Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company. 
May, J., Dhillon G., and Caldeira M. 2013. Defining value-based objectives for ERP systems planning. 
Decision Support Systems 55(1), 98–109. 
McFarlane, L., & Bocij, P. 2005. An exploration of predatory behavior in cyberspace: Towards a typology 
of cyber stalkers. Retrieved Feb 18, 2016, from 
http://firstmonday.org/issues/issues8_9/mcfarlane/index.html. 
Spitzberg, B., Nicastro, A. & Cousins, A. 1998. ‘Exploring the Interactional Phenomenon of Stalking and 
Obsessive Relational Intrusion’, Communication Reports 11(1): 33–48. 
 
Spitzberg, B. & Rhea, J. 1999. ‘Obsessive Relational Intrusion and Sexual Coercion Victimization’, Journal 
of Interpersonal Violence 14(1): 3–20. 
 
Spitzberg, B., Marshall, L. & Cupach, W. 2001. ‘Obsessive Relational Intrusion, Coping, and Sexual 
Coercion Victimization’, Communication Reports 14(1): 19–30. 
 
Witesman, E. M., & Walters, L. C. 2014. Modeling Public Decision Preferences Using Context-Specific 
Value Hierarchies. The American Review of Public Administration, 45(1), 86-105. 
